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Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.: The Role of
Mitigating Measures in Determining
Disabilities

In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,' the United States Supreme Court
held that the determination of "disability" under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")2 requires a consideration of any
mitigating or corrective measures.3 The Court further held that an
individual is "regarded as" disabled under the ADA if a covered entity
mistakenly believes that the individual's actual, yet nonlimiting,
impairment substantially limits a major life activity.4 This Casenote

focuses only on the issue of whether the determination of disability
under the ADA should be made with reference to any mitigating
measures for the impairment.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton, twin sisters suffering from severe
myopia, applied for employment as commercial airline pilots with United
Air Lines ("United"), a major commercial airline carrier. The sisters met
United's various employment criteria such as age, education, experience,
and FAA certification. After the sisters submitted their applications,
United invited them to participate in interviews and flight simulator
tests. However, when they arrived for the interviews and tests, they
were told that there had been a mistake in inviting them to interview
because they did not meet the airline's minimum vision requirement,
which was 20/100 uncorrected visual acuity or better. Neither Sutton
nor Hinton could meet this requirement because each sister had visual
acuity of 20/200 or worse in her right eye and 20/400 or worse in her left
eye; however, corrective lenses made each sister's eyesight 20/20 or
better. Nevertheless, both Sutton's and Hinton's interviews were

1. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999) (7-2 decision).
2.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).

3. 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
4. Id.
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terminated, and United did not offer either sister a commercial pilot
position.5
Sutton and Hinton then filed a charge of discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on the basis of
United's refusal to interview or hire them because of their uncorrected
vision impairments.6 After they received their right-to-sue letter, they
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado,
alleging that United had violated the ADA by discriminating against
them "on the basis of their disability, or because [United] regarded
[Sutton and Hinton] as having a disability."7 In their complaint Sutton
and Hinton specifically alleged that as a result of suffering from severe
myopia, "they actually have a substantially limiting impairment or are
regarded as having such an impairment... and are thus disabled under
the Act."8
The district court dismissed the sisters' complaint because it failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.9 First, plaintiffs were
not actually and substantially limited in any major life activity because
their vision impairments could be fully corrected, and thus they had not
stated a claim that they were disabled within the meaning of the
ADA.' 0 Second, Sutton and Hinton had not sufficiently alleged that
United regarded them as having an impairment that substantially limits
a major life activity because they only alleged that United regarded
them as unable to satisfy the specific job requirements of global airline
pilots." Upon the sisters' appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.2 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split among the
courts of appeals." As to the role that mitigating measures should
play in determining disability, the Supreme Court held that "disability"
within the meaning of the ADA "is to be determined with reference to
corrective measures." 4 Thus, the Court affirmed the decision of the
court of appeals, which had affirmed the district court's dismissal of

5. Id. at 2143.
6. Id.; see also Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., Civ. A. No. 96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917,
at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 28, 1996).
7. 119 S. Ct. at 2143 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Id. at 2144.
9. 1996 WL 588917, at *6.
10. Id. at *3-4.
11. Id. at *5.
12. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 906 (10th Cir. 1997).
13. 119 S. Ct. at 2144.
14. Id. at 2149.
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plaintiffs' claim that they are substantially limited in any major life
activity by their severe myopia.15
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The ADA provides that no covered employer "shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability
of such individual in regard to job application procedures; the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees; employee compensation; job
16
training; and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."
The ADA defines a "'qualified individual with a disability'" as "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires." 7 The term "disability" is defined by
the ADA as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment."' 8
The definition of "disability" is part of the ADA's generally applicable
provisions, and Congress did not delegate the responsibilities of
interpreting the term "disability" to any particular agency such as the
EEOC or the Justice Department. Nevertheless, both agencies have
promulgated regulations interpreting the definition of "disability" under
the ADA. Most notably, the EEOC regulations set forth three necessary
elements of a disability under the ADA: (1) "physical or mental
9
impairment," (2) "substantially limits," and (3) "major life activities."'
Additionally, the EEOC issued an Interpretative Guidance along with
these regulations to aid in their implementation. The guidelines in this
document provide that "[tihe determination of whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by
measures such as medicines, or
case basis, without regardto mitigating
20
assistive or prosthetic devices."

15. Id. The Court also affirmed the lower court's decision that Sutton and Hinton had
failed to state a claim that they had been regarded by United as having a disability. Id.
at 2152. To be disabled within the meaning of the ADA, plaintiffs should have alleged and
demonstrated that United's "vision requirement reflects a belief that petitioners' vision
substantially limits them." Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
17. Id. § 12111(8).
18. Id. § 12102(2).
19. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)-O) (1999).
20. Id. app. § 1630.2(0) (emphasis added).
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In Sutton the Supreme Court identified five decisions of the federal
circuit courts as being "in tension" with the Tenth Circuit's decision. 2'
In each of these five decisions, the circuit court held that disabilities
should be determined without regard to any mitigating measures;
however, each court placed a varying degree of importance on the
statute's language, the EEOC regulations, and the ADA's legislative
history in reaching its decision to disregard mitigating measures.22
Because the First Circuit's decision in Arnold v. United Parcel Service,
Inc.2" is representative of the logic these courts used to conclude that
the determination of disability should disregard any mitigating or
corrective measures, it will be discussed in detail as illustrative of the
analysis adopted by a majority of circuit courts prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Sutton.
In Arnold the First Circuit held that plaintiff's diabetes, without
regard to any treatment for it, is a disability within the meaning of the
ADA. 24 Arnold met with representatives of United Parcel Service
("UPS") to discuss his application for a position as a mechanic. At that
time the representatives assured Arnold that he could have the position.
After Arnold accepted the job offer the next day, a UPS representative
informed him that he would be required to pass a driving test, submit
his fingerprints, complete more paperwork, and submit to a Department
of Transportation ("DOT") physical. Arnold was informed at his physical
that he could not obtain DOT certification because he was an insulindependent diabetic, and another UPS representative later informed
Arnold that the company could not hire him as a mechanic, but offered
him an alternate position.25
Arnold brought suit against UPS, alleging that UPS violated the ADA
in refusing to hire him because of his diabetes.2" The district court
granted summary judgment for UPS on the ground that Arnold failed to

21. 119 S. Ct. at 2144. According to the dissent in Sutton, eight of the nine federal
circuit courts that have heard cases involving this issue have held that mitigating
measures should not be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially
limited in a major life activity. Id. at 2153 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. See Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir.
1998); Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1998);
Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1998); Arnold v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859-66 (1st Cir. 1998); Matczak v. Frankford Candy &
Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997).
23. 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998).
24. Id. at 866.
25. Id. at 857.
26. Id. at 856.
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show that he had a disability within the meaning of the ADA.27 The
district court's decision turned in large part on the "ameliorative effects
of [Arnold's] insulin medication."" The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit reversed, concluding that Arnold's diabetes would place him
under the ADA's protection "if he is disabled based on his underlying
medical condition, without regard to whether some of his
29 limitations are
ameliorated through medication or other treatment."
In reversing the district court, the court of appeals relied on tools of
statutory construction after it determined that the ADA's language was
not clear with respect to the role that ameliorative measures should play
in determining whether a disability falls within the protection of the
ADA.3 ° The court reached its decision by analyzing the legislative
history of the ADA, but it also found persuasive authority in both the
EEOC regulations and the decisions of other federal circuit courts.
First, the court considered the legislative history of the ADA and
concluded that Congress intended for the determination of disability
under the ADA to not include consideration of any mitigating or
corrective measures.3 1 The court cited House and Senate committee
reports that expressly stated that plaintiff's impairment "should be
assessed without considering whether mitigating measures, such as
auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations, would result in a lessthan-substantial limitation."32 The court noted that in two different
committee reports Congress directly addressed diabetes and the effect
that medication might have upon it: "'[Plersons with impairments, such
as epilepsy or diabetes, which substantially limit a major life activity,'
are considered to have an actual disability, 'even if the effects of the
impairment are controlled by medication.'"3 3 Thus, the legislative

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 859.

31. Id.
32. Id. at 859-60 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 52, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989).
33. 136 F.3d at 860 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 52, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334); see also S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 22. Similarly, the district court
focused on language in a Senate Report indicating that one of the goals of defining

"disability" was "to ensure that persons with medical conditions that are under control, and
that therefore do not currently limit major life activities, are not discriminated against on
the basis of their medical conditions" to conclude that mitigating measures should be
considered. 136 F.3d at 860 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 24). However, the court of

appeals questioned the weight that the district court gave this single passage because it
was limited to prong three of the definition of disability while other explicit passages stated
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history revealed explicit congressional intentions to make the determination of whether a disability falls within the ADA independent of any
consideration of mitigating measures to control the impairment.
Second, the court looked to the congressional objective to be served by
the ADA and how the definition of "disability" fit into that objective.34
The court observed that the overall objective of the ADA is "'to provide
a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.'"35 As to employment discrimination, the court noted that the statute was aimed at
protecting persons who have an impairment, "but who are in fact capable
of doing the job."36 The court stated that the ADA's remedial purpose
called for a broad interpretation of the term "individual with a disability" and that such a broad interpretation does not rob employers of any
protection because other ADA provisions balance their interests.3 7
Statistics cited in the ADA's preamble show a large and increasing
number of Americans with physical or mental disabilities, and these
statistics convinced the court that Congress intended for the ADA's
"protective umbrella" to cover a large percentage of the population.38
Based on the ADA's legislative history and broad remedial purposes,
the court concluded that the district court should not have considered
the ameliorative effects of Arnold's medication in determining whether
his diabetes constituted a disability under the ADA. 3' However, the
court did not end its analysis of the issue there; it also considered the
position taken by the EEOC, as well as the decisions of other federal
courts of appeals following the EEOC interpretation, to be persuasive
authority that the district court had ignored.4 °
The court recognized that the EEOC Interpretative Guidance was not
controlling on the issue because it did not carry the weight of an actual
regulation; nevertheless, the court stated that it was entitled to some

that such measures should not be considered. Id. Moreover, the court of appeals
reconciled these seemingly inconsistent statements by suggesting that a person could have
a disability under prong one (having an impairment that actually and substantially limits
a major life activity) and prong three ("regarded as" having such an impairment). Id. In
other words, the two prongs are not mutually exclusive.
34. 136 F.3d at 861.

35. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)).
36. Id.
37. Id. For instance, the court noted that the "individual with a disability" must still
be "qualified" or able to perform the essential functions of the job. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111(8), 12112(a)).

38. Id. at 862.
39. Id. at 863.
40. Id. at 863-65.
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deference. 4 For several reasons the court noted that the EEOC
interpretation was consistent with the court's decision based on the
ADA's legislative history and broad remedial purposes. First, the court
stated that it had looked to that same Interpretative Guidance in its
effort to interpret the ADA on other occasions. 42 Second, the existence
of a nearly identical interpretation by the Department of Justice
bolstered the reasonableness of the EEOC's interpretation."
Finally, the court followed the majority of federal circuit courts that
had considered the issue when it decided that mitigating measures
should not be considered in determining whether an impairment
substantially limits a plaintiff's major life activities." Moreover, the
court refuted the contentions of UPS that these other courts "merely
acknowledged the existence of the EEOC guidelines" by pointing out that
the other courts cited the guidelines as support for the principle on
which they based their rationale.45 Even though the Eleventh Circuit
gave full deference to the EEOC interpretation in Harris v. H & W
Contracting Co.," the court in Arnold stated that the decision in that
case was still well grounded.4 7 Furthermore, the court in Arnold gave
a lesser degree of deference to the guidelines and instead based its
decision on the legislative history and broad remedial purposes of the
ADA. 4s
It is worth noting that the First Circuit limited its holding in Arnold
to the facts surrounding plaintiff's diabetes and refused to speculate
generally on other medical conditions, instead reiterating that the
determination of disability under the ADA must be done on a case-bycase basis. 49 However, in a footnote at the end of the opinion, the court
suggested that a different outcome might result in a case in which the
impairment was myopia that might be fully correctable with eyeglasses
or contact lenses: "The availability of such a simple, inexpensive
remedy, that can provide assured, total and relatively permanent control
of all symptoms, would seem to make correctable myopia the kind of

41. Id. at 864.
42. Id.
43. Id.

44. Id. at 865-66 (citing Matczak, 136 F.3d at 936-37; Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d
624, 627-28 (8th Cir. 1997); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (11th
Cir. 1996); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996); Roth v.

Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995)).
45. Id.
46. 102 F.3d at 521.
47. 136 F.3d at 866.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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'minor, trivial impairment'. . . that would not be considered a disability
under the ADA."5"
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Sutton and its
companion case, Murphy v. Unitcd Parcel Service, Inc.," eight of the
nine federal courts of appeals that had heard cases involving this issue
had held as the court in Arnold did: Such mitigating or corrective
measures were not to be considered in determining what constituted a
disability within the ADA."' Therefore, it would not have been
surprising for the Supreme Court to follow the interpretations of eight
federal circuit courts and several federal agencies on the issue of
mitigating measures. However, the Court took a different route.
III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor first gave an overview of
the legislative and administrative framework surrounding the ADA. 3
In analyzing whether plaintiffs stated a claim under subsection (A) of
the ADA's disability definition, the Court recognized that deciding
whether the two sisters sufficiently alleged that their physical impairment substantially limits them in a major life activity specifically "turns
on whether disability is to be determined with or without reference to
corrective measures." 4 Sutton and Hinton argued that "the Court
should defer to agency interpretations of the statue" because the ADA
does not explicitly address the issue. 5 On the other hand, United
argued that the EEOC guidelines were in direct conflict with the plain
meaning of the ADA, in which case the Court should not defer to the
agency interpretations.58 United also maintained that disregarding
mitigating measures would, in turn, disregard the statutory command
to examine impairments on a case-by-case basis.57 The Court agreed
with United and concluded that both the positive and negative effects of
mitigating measures should be considered in determining whether an

50. Id. at 866 n.10 (quoting S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989)).
51. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
52. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, the only federal
circuit to hold otherwise was the Tenth Circuit from which Sutton originated.
53. 119 S. Ct. at 2144-46.
54. Id. at 2146.
55. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioners at 6, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct.
2139 (1999) (No. 97-1943).
56. 119 S. Ct. at 2146; see also Brief for Respondent at 26-27, Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999) (No. 97-1943).
57. 119 S. Ct. at 2146; see also Brief for Respondent at 28, Sutton (No. 97-1943).
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individual "is 'substantially limited' in a major life activity and thus
'disabled' under the Act."86
As support for its conclusion that a determination of disability must
take into account mitigating measures, the majority relied solely on the
textual provisions of the ADA without resorting to legislative history or
agency interpretations.59 Justice O'Connor's analysis followed the three
statutory provisions for support for the proposition that mitigating
measures must be considered. First, the Court found that the actual
language used to define "disability" was critical.8' The ADA defines
disability as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities."61 The Court thought the verb
phrase "substantially limits" indicates a requirement that the individual
be "presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited
in order to demonstrate a disability."2 The Court based this on the
drafters' use of the present indicative verb form, implying that the
individual must be currently limited and not simply that he "might" or
"could" or "would" be limited but for the mitigating measures.6 3
Second, the Court agreed with United that the individual inquiry
requirement would be sacrificed if courts and employers were required
to speculate about an individual's condition, leading to disability
determinations based only on general information.' The individualized
inquiry goes hand-in-hand with the definition of disability; generalized
information could lead to lumping members with similar impairments
in one group rather than considering each member's impairment
individually.6 5
Moreover, as the Court pointed out, disregarding
mitigating measures under the agency approach would lead to an
anomalous result whereby courts and employers could not take into
account any negative side effects associated with the mitigating
measures. 66 Ignoring the negative side effects that might play a
decisive role in determining whether a person is disabled under the ADA
does nothing
to further the congressional concerns for an individualized
67
inquiry.

58. 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
59. Id.

60. Id.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
62.

119 S. Ct. at 2146.

63. Id.
64.

Id. at 2147.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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Finally, the Court relied on statistical findings enacted as part of the
ADA in its general provisions, indicating that "'some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this
6
number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older.'" 8
Under this analysis the Court essentially stated that if Congress
intended to bring every individual with a correctable limitation within
the ADA's protection, it would have cited a number higher than fortythree million. 9 The majority arrived at this conclusion by analyzing
several different statistical reports from the same period as the ADA's
drafting and enactment. From all of the statistical data, the majority
was able to extrapolate that the thirty-six million included in the
findings of the ADA's predecessor bill reflected a "work disabilities
approach" to defining disability rather than the "health conditions
approach."7"
The Court also examined a 1988 report from the National Council on
Disability that described a study of 37.3 million disabled persons based
on a functional approach, focusing on basic physical activities such as
"seeing, hearing, speaking, walking, using stairs, lifting or carrying,
getting around outside, getting around inside, and getting into or out of
bed."7 However, because this report did not account for any institutionalized persons with physical disabilities, the Court attributed the 5.7
million gap between the ADA's findings and the Council's report to this
shortcoming." As a practical matter, currently the estimated number
of people throughout the United States with vision impairments is one
hundred million,7" with impaired hearing is twenty-eight million,74
and with hypertension is fifty million.75 The fact that the ADA's
findings are not large enough to incorporate these correctable impairments led the Court to believe that Congress did not intend to extend
the ADA's 76protection to those individuals whose impairments are
correctable.

68. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)).
69. Id. at 2149.
70. Id. at 2147-48. The "work disabilities approach" focuses on the individual's reported
ability to work and in 1986 was estimated to total 22.7 million disabled individuals; the
"health conditions approach," on the other hand, considers all conditions that impair an
individual's health or normal functional abilities, leading to an estimated total of 160
million disabled Americans. Id.
71. Id. at 2148 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2149.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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The Court concluded by addressing some of the concerns voiced in
Justice Stevens's dissent. First, the majority pointed out that the mere
use of a corrective device or medication does not cancel out an individual's disability; rather, a court must still determine whether that
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity notwithstanding the mitigating measure.77 For example, an individual with high
blood pressure may take hypertension medication and still be substantially limited in one of his major life activities such as running or
lifting.7 s For the Court it was critical to preserve the individual
inquiry, and considering mitigating measures does nothing to harm this
determination, but rather aids the court in this endeavor.79 Additionally, as the Court noted, an individual may alternatively be included
under the ADA if a covered employer regarded her as disabled even if
she is not substantially limited in a major life activity (perhaps by the
use of mitigating or corrective measures).,s The Court considered
neither of these concerns by the dissent to be valid, and thus the Court
affirmed the circuit court's holding that Sutton and Hinton had not
stated a claim that they are substantially limited in a major life
activity."'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg stated that the strongest
evidence supporting the decision was, in fact, the congressional finding
that "'some 43 million have one or more physical or mental disabilities. ' " 2 Justice Ginsburg also keyed in on other language in the ADA's
prefatory findings that stated that "'individuals with disabilities are a
discrete and insular minority,' persons 'subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society.'" 3 Justice Ginsburg stated that extending the ADA's protection to those correctable impairments that do not
substantially limit a major life activity contradicts the nature of
8 4 She was
protecting the disabled as a discrete and insular minority.
careful to note that there was no "constitutional dimension" in Sutton,
but rather Congress's use of equal protection language is evidence of
intent in the statute not to consider such a large group disabled, as
Sutton and Hinton urged. 5 Therefore, she agreed with the majority

77.

Id.

78. See id.
79. Id. at 2147.
80. Id. at 2149.

81. Id.
82. Id. at 2152 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)).
83. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)).
84. Id.

85. Id.
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does not extend to
that subsection (A) of the ADA's disability definition
86
disabilities.
their
mitigate
or
correct
who
persons
Justice Stevens offered a different line of analysis in his dissenting
opinion, which Justice Breyer joined. 87 According to Justice Stevens,
a Court must first decide whether the determination of disability should
consider the individual's impairment in its unmitigated or mitigated
condition." If the unmitigated condition is the basis for the determination of disability, the court should next ask if the general rule should be
applied to what could be regarded as a "'minor, trivial impairment.'8 9
Beginning with a consideration of the ADA's text and the legislative
purpose behind the statute, Justice Stevens stated, "The sweep of the
statute's three-pronged definition, however, makes it pellucidly clear
that Congress intended the Act to cover [persons who correct or mitigate
Under the majority's analysis of the present
their impairments]."'
indicative verb tense, subsection (A) of the disability definition would not
apply, according to Justice Stevens. 9 Likewise, Justice Stevens stated
that the majority's focus on "presen[t]-not potentia[l] or hypothetica[l]"
substantial limitations would make subsections (B) and (C) of the
disability definition inapplicable as well.92 Justice Stevens hypothesized that if Congress meant to exclude persons who are not presently
and substantially limited in a major life activity, subsection (B) would
be useless because it is geared towards individuals with a record of
disability, implying that they may not be substantially limited at the
time of the alleged disability discrimination.9 3
Justice Stevens then surveyed the ADA's legislative history to resolve
any ambiguity that may remain after a textual analysis and found what
he considered clear support in the committee reports on the bill. 94
Justice Stevens laid out a chronological sequence of events involving the

86. Id.
87. Id. at 2152-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also contributed a dissenting
opinion that basically followed Justice Stevens's reasoning; however, Justice Breyer also
added that the EEOC could remedy any onslaught of litigation that might result from a
broader interpretation disregarding mitigating measures through tightened regulations.
See id. at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This argument turns on how much authority the
EEOC has to interpret the ADA, and the issue of deference was not certified by the Court.
88. Id. at 2153 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (quoting Arnold, 136 F.3d at 866 n. 10). Interestingly, the court in Arnold was
merely quoting language in a Senate Report that suggested there might be some "trivial"
impairments that fall outside the ADA's protection. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989).
90. 119 S. Ct. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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committee reports and the ADA bill, noting that the bill originated in
the Senate.95 As the federal circuit courts discussed in many decisions
on this issue, the Senate Report stated that "'whether a person has a
disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of
mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary
aids."' g He further noted the Senate Report's emphasis under prong
three, or the "regarded as" prong, on ensuring that employers do not
discriminate against individuals who have corrected their impairments.97 As Justice Stevens pointed out, when the House of Representatives considered the ADA legislation, the House committees only
slightly modified the Senate's expression of how far the ADA coverage
extends by clarifying that "correctable" or "controllable" disabilities were
covered under the ADA's protection under prong one as well.9"
Additionally, Justice Stevens relied on the interpretations of the three
agencies responsible for implementing the ADA's provisions, suggesting
that they were entitled to some degree of deference because they "'played
a pivotal role in setting [the statutory] machinery in motion.'"99 Most
notably, the EEOC regulations, such as its Interpretative Guidance,
persuaded Justice Stevens that the determination of disability within
the ADA should be made without regard to mitigating measures.'0 0
In addressing the majority's reliance on the statistical finding of fortythree million disabled Americans and Justice Ginsburg's reliance on the
equal protection language, Justice Stevens proposed a new question to
address: Whether, in light of these two considerations, the Court
"should construe the term 'disability' to exclude individuals with
impairments that Congress probably did not have in mind."' Justice
Stevens stated that the ADA's umbrella should be extended to cover
those individuals with mitigated conditions to effectuate the ADA's broad

95. Id. at 2154-55.
96. Id. at 2154 (quoting S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989)).
97. Id. at 2154-55 (citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24). Prong three refers to the
element of "major life activities" within the statutory definition of "disability." Likewise,
prong one refers to the "physical or mental impairment" element of the term "disability."

Id.
98. Id. at 2155 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 28-29 (1990), reprintedin 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,451; H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. I, at 52, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 334).
99. Id. (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980))

(alteration in original).
100. Id. at 2156. Justice Stevens quoted the EEOC regulations and Department of
Justice regulations at great length and noted that the Department of Transportation had
adopted a similar definition of "disability." Id.
101. Id.
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remedial purposes. 10 2 Justice Stevens compared the need for consulting legislative history and agency interpretations in reaching this
conclusion to the role that the Court played in interpreting Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include races other than AfricanAmericans, which was the primary race sought to be protected by the
drafters of Title VII. 1° 3
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

After Sutton the new standard for interpreting subsection (A) of the
disability definition of the ADA is, notwithstanding any mitigating or
corrective measures, whether the plaintiff's impairment substantially
limits him in a major life activity. Post-Sutton cases have followed the
new standard by carefully analyzing the actual effects of the impairment
as well as the positive and negative side effects of the individual's
treatment or medication. This new consideration of mitigating measures
will effectively redefine or limit which major life activities are substantially limited by the impairment because trial courts will have to look at
the actual, present limitation under the standard dictated by Sutton. In
EEOC v. R.J. Gallagher Co.,' 4 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit addressed this issue soon after the Supreme Court decided
Sutton and concluded that plaintiff did not come within the protection
afforded by the ADA under section 12102(2)(A). 1°' Because plaintiff's
cancer was in remission when he returned to work and his doctors gave
him an unqualified clearance to return to work, the court held that he
could not be substantially limited in the major life activity of working.106

Shortly after the Fifth Circuit's decision in R.J. Gallagher,the District
Court for the Southern District of Texas concluded in Todd v. Academy
Corp.I'7 that plaintiff did not meet the definition of "disability" when
he only alleged general evidence of side effects from his medication
rather than a particular limitation on a major life activity. ' ° The
court stressed the Supreme Court's emphasis in Sutton on the individualized inquiry to be made in determining whether a plaintiff has a

102. Id. at 2157.
103. Id. Justice Stevens found it ironic that in Title VII cases the Court relied on
legislative history and gave a greater degree of deference to the EEOC interpretation. Id.
104. 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 1999).
105. Id. at 655.
106. Id.
107. 57 F. Supp. 2d 448 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
108. Id. at 454.
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disability under the ADA.' °9 "[Tihe disability status of a person under
the ADA is determined on the basis of whether the particular ailment
suffered by that person, in its corrected or mitigated state, is a
substantial limitation on that particular person in his particular life
situation.""0 The court also noted the Supreme Court's instructions
for trial courts to weigh negative as well as positive effects of any
mitigating measures, such as side effects of medication."' In evaluating the facts in Todd, the court acknowledged the decreased intellectual
functioning associated with epilepsy medications."' However, plaintiff
merely cited evidence of general negative side effects and did not
1 3
particularize any decrease in intellectual capacity to his situation.
This made it impossible for the court to evaluate whether the decrease
in intellectual functioning was a substantial limitation on plaintiff's
major life activities, and the court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment on this ground." 4
The court in Todd seemed to hint that the outcome might have been
different if plaintiff had only presented more specific evidence regarding
his particular side effects and particular substantial limitations on major
life activities."' Thus, it seerhs that to survive summary judgment
despite mitigating measures, a plaintiff must allege and show three
factors: (1) the plaintiff has an impairment that substantially limits one
of his major life activities; (2) the plaintiff has taken measures to correct
or mitigate that impairment; and (3) notwithstanding this mitigating or
corrective measure, the plaintiff is still substantially limited in one or
more of his major life activities. This is supported by the recent decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in McAlindin v.County of
San Diego."6 In that case the court noted the Supreme Court's
recognition that "in some cases the use of medication may not eradicate
the effects of illness, and a disability may remain either due to
symptoms of the condition itself which persist despite the effects of
medication, or as a result of the medication's side-effects."" 7 Plaintiff
in McAlindin alleged that his mental impairment of "fear reaction" and

109. Id. at 453 (citing Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2142).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 454 (citing Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2142).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. The only reference that plaintiff made in this regard to his situation was that
he was "somewhat" limited; therefore, the court did not find that to be a "substantial
limitation" under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Id.
115. See id.
116. 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999), amended by 201 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2000).
117. 192 F.3d at 1236 (citing Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149).
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"communicative paralysis" still "affected him '[diespite the medications.""'8 The court determined that this presented a genuine issue
of material fact because it could not be said as a matter of law whether
plaintiff's impairment substantially limited his major life activities
notwithstanding his medication and other treatment."9 Thus, this
decision appeared to bring this particular plaintiff within the class of
persons described in Sutton as protected by subsection (A) of the ADA's
disability definition.
To be protected by the ADA under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), it is now
critical that plaintiffs allege that they are still substantially limited in
a major life activity notwithstanding any measures taken to mitigate or
correct their impairments. As the decision in McAlindin shows,
plaintiffs who sufficiently allege this will probably survive a motion for
summary judgment. However, as the post-Sutton cases have indicated,
the focus will then turn to what constitutes a substantial limitation and
major life activity for that particular person.
JULIA J. HALL

118. Id. at 1235-36.
119. Id.

